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FIFTEEN-YEAR SURVEY OF CORPORATE DEVELOPMENTS,
1944-1959
MIGUEL A. DE CAPRILES*

I. INTRODUCTION

The post-World War II years hold a particular fascination for
corporation lawyers. The end of armed conflict in the shadow of
the atomic bomb was but the beginning of the cold war between East
and West. The battle for men's minds overshadowed the conquest
of territories. And in a very real sense the corporate system of
economic activity became a symbol of the "American way of life"
for a large sector of our population.
The tremendous wartime productive effort, the continued expansion
of the civilian economy after the war, and the almost uninterrupted
prosperity of the transitional years have all operated to solidify
popular support of private enterprise as exemplified by the modern
corporation. There is some evidence that the number of persons
who have a proprietary stake in the corporate system through direct
shareholding or indirectly through pension funds, insurance, annuities, etc., has been growing faster than the population as a whole.'
Observers disagree as to whether this trend is sufficient to justify
the inference that we have moved into an era of "people's capitalism,"
but the notion that the corporate system should be a "socially responsible" capitalism has undoubtedly gained broad acceptance. The
process of divorcement of ownership from control has probably been
accelerated; but the steady rise of professional management has also
seen its leaders publicly express views concerning the obligations of
modern corporate enterprise that before World War II were largely
limited to academicians and New Dealers. 2 Nevertheless, the means
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean, New York University School of
Law. Acknowledgment is made of the assistance of David N. Brainin, of the
New York bar, in the preparation of this article.
1. Figures issued by the New York Stock Exchange show that in 1952 there
were 6,490,000 shareowners in the United States; in 1956, 8,630,000; and in
1959, 12,490,000. BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 470 (1959). Estimated population of voting age was 98,133,000 in 1952;
102,743,000 in 1956; 104,582,000 in 1958. BUREAU or CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 357 (1959).
2. A current illustration is the 1959 steel strike, in which the social responsibility of corporate management to reverse the inflationary trend rather
than the profits needed for shareholders, has been the main point on which
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of achieving such social responsibility are not at all clear; in fact,
the most widely followed modern corporation law has been character'3
ized as an "invitation to irresponsibility.
In brief, the corporation is today recognized as a valuable instrument of freedom and diversification of economic activity, in that
it provides for decentralization of decision-making in economic
affairs; but we have not by far solved the problems of keeping
management honest and efficient and of coordinating the work of
corporations, labor and government in the achievement of national
objectives.
In this setting, the past fifteen years have witnessed a remarkable
variety of important corporate developments. Control of corporate
management for the protection of the investor and the public is a
central theme; its counterpoint is the demand of management for
freedom to manage. Perhaps the decade brought to an end in the
mid-1930's by the impact of the new federal securities acts had a
more dramatic significance; but it is hard to find another comparable
period in the history of corporation law and practice in the United
States that has been so rich in legislative, administrative, judicial
"and scholarly activity. It is possible in each year to find at least one
statute, one decision, one administrative ruling, one article or book,
that may fairly be regarded as a milestone along a tortuous road with
many turns and cutbacks.
For example, this survey starts a year earlier than the cessation of
hostilities of World War II because it was in 1944 that the state of
New York ushered in a new era of restrictions upon shareholders'
actions through the enactment of the first "security for expenses"
statute. 4 There were other important developments at the time, of
course, 5 but this was a major landmark. The next year, 1945, the
United States Supreme Court, in the International Shoe case, established new standards for subjecting foreign corporations to the
service of process. In 1946 the Kardon case 7 sustained the principle
of civil liability, under the rules of the Securities and Exchange
Commission,8 for failure to disclose material facts in the sale of
the companies have relied to justify their position. See, also, STANDARD OIL
COMPANY OF NEW JERSEY, 75TH ANNUAL MEETING 7 (1957), cited and quoted
in Gibson, How Fixed Are Class Shareholder Rights?, 23 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 283, 305-06 (1958).

3. Harris, The Model Business Corporation Act-Invitation to Irresponsi-

bility?, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 1 (1955).
4. N.Y. GEN. CoRp. LAW § 61-b (Supp. 1959).
5. E.g., the 1944 amendment of N.Y. GEN. CoRp. LAw § 61 (Supp. 1959)
(establishing "contemporaneous ownership" rule); Goldstein v. Groesbeck,
142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1944) ("double derivative" action).
6. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
7. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 52 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (decision
on demurrer), 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (decision on merits).
8. SEC Rule X-1OB-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10B-5 (1949).
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securities. In 1947 the Remington Rand case 9 outlined some public
policy limitations upon the business judgment of directors in the
management of corporations. In 1948 the enactment of section 9
of the New York Stock Corporation Law constituted the first important legislative recognition of the special management problems
of close corporations. And 1949 was notable for at least one important
event: the dissolution of Alexander Hamilton's celebrated Society
for Establishing Useful Manufactures (incorporated in New Jersey
in 1791), reputed to be the last surviving corporation whose legislative
charter and exemption from taxation were, under the doctrine of
the Dartmouth College case, not subject to amendment or repeal.' 0
The "first complete edition" of the American Bar Association's
Model Business Corporations Act, which was to have a profound
effect on later revisions of state corporation laws, was published in
1950.11 The next year, 1951, marked the appearance of the outstanding
treatise on securities regulation.' 2 In 1952 a trial court in the
Fairchild Engine & Airplane case 13 for the first time sustained the
right of both incumbents and successful insurgents to obtain reimbursement of their campaign expenses out of the corporate treasury.
In 1953 the legal vindication of corporate support to education was
particularly significant. 14 In 1954 came the first major revision of the
federal securities laws, designed to liberalize filing requirements and
to facilitate offers to buy and sell between the time of filing of a
registration statement and its effective date.' 5
The principle of absolute accountability for profits realized from
the sale of corporate control was announced for the first time in
1955 in Perlman v. Feldmann.16 In 1956 while the dominant theme
of scholarly writings was "corporate democracy,"' 17 the SEC laid down
9. Abrams v. Allen, 297 N.Y. 52, 74 N.E.2d 305 (1947).
10. Grobart v. Society for Establishing Useful Manufactures, 65 A.2d 833
(N.J. 1949).
11. 6 Bus. LAW. 1, 7 (1950). The Model Act has been published. ABA-ALI
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT (1953). Revisions, alternative provisions and optional
sections approved through 1957 are published as a supplemental leaflet. The
A.B.A. Model Act must be distinguished from the Uniform Business Corporation Act published in 1928 by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and
later designated a "model" act.
12. Loss, SEcurmIEs REGULATION (1951, Supp. 1955).
13. Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp. 116 N.Y.S.2d 840 (Sup.
Ct. 1952), ajf'd, 284 App. Div. 201, 132 N.Y.S.2d 273 (1954), aifd, 309 N.Y. 168,
128 N.E.2d 291 (1955).

14. See A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581 (1953),
appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953), noted in 1953 ANNUAL Surv. Amx. L.
403-404.
15. Securities Act of 1933, 68 Stat. 684 (1954), 15 U.S.C. § 77b (Supp. 1958).
16. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).

17. See, e.g., Garrett, Attitudes on Corporate Democracy-A Critical Analysis, 51 Nw. U. L. REV. 310 (1956); Slavin, Book Review, 33 U. DET. L.J. 421
(1956); Aranow & Einhorn, Corporate Proxy Contests: Enforcement of SEC
Proxy Rules by the Commission and Private Parties, 31 N.Y.U.L. REV. 875
(1956).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 13

its "Marquis of Queensberry" (proxy) rules to govern the struggle for
power. 18 In 1957 Greene v. Dietz19 invalidated the SEC rule exempting restricted stock options from the "insiders' profits" provisions of
the Securities Act.20 In 1958 came the first comprehensive treatise
and manual on close corporations. 21 In the spring of 1959 variable
annuities were brought under SEC regulation as "securities"; z2 and,
as this article goes to press, a distinguished scholar and practitioner,
George D. Hornstein, has brought out a two-volume treatise on CorporationLaw and Practice that in my judgment will become the basic
tool of corporation lawyers.2a
It is recognized, of course, that the foregoing list represents personal
choices, the wisdom of which leaves room for considerable disagreement. Nevertheless, a similar effort will be made to summarize in
a few pages the discernible trends in a number of areas of corporation law, particularly those which are not especially covered in other
articles of this symposium.
II. MAJOR STATUTORY REVISIONS
The post-war period has produced some fifteen major statutory
revisions in the corporation laws of the United States: Kentucky
(1946), Oklahoma (1947), Maryland and Wisconsin (1951), Florida
and Oregon (1953), District of Columbia (1954), North Carolina,
Ohio, and Texas (1955), Pennsylvania and Virginia (1956), Alaska
and North Dakota (1957), and Colorado (1958). Eight of the thirteen
enacted since 195023 follow, without change or with relatively minor
variations, the American Bar Association's Model Business Corporation Act.24 The Model Act has influenced the other five2 and probably
will affect in substantial degree the current projects for revision of
the corporation laws of New York and New Jersey.2
On the whole it is clear that the new statutes embody what has
been called the "enabling act" theory that would impose a minimum
of a priori conditions and limitations on the privilege of incorporation. Although the trend is generally deplored by the academic fra18. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a (Supp.1959).
19. 247 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1957).
20. SEC Rule X-16B-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3 (Supp. 1959).

21.

O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS

(1958).

22. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65 (1959),
reversing 257 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
22a. HORNsTEIN, CORPORATION LAw AND PRACTICE (1959).

23. Alaska (1957),

Colorado (1958), District of Columbia (1954), North

Dakota (1957), Oregon (1953), Texas (1955), Virginia (1956), and Wisconsin
(1951).

24. Note 11, supra.

25. Florida (1953), Maryland (1951), North Carolina (1955), Ohio (1955)
and Pennsylvania (1956).
26. For detailed analysis of the extent to which the A.B.A. Model Act has
influenced corporation laws, see Katz, The Philosophy of Mid-Century Corporation Statutes, 23 LAw & CONTEmP. PROB. 175 (1958).
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ternity,27 it may be reasonably argued that this theory becomes a

practical necessity so long as the corporation laws are intended to
apply equally to the incorporated partnership and the giant enterprise. In this view regulation in the public interest is more effectively
spelled out in the securities acts, the antitrust laws and similar
statutes related to the behavior of corporations rather than in the
organic act.
III. CLOSE CoRPOATIONS

The post-war years have witnessed a tremendous growth of interest
in the special problems of close corporations. From a practical point
of view, perhaps the most significant development has been Subchapter
S of the Internal Revenue Code, which is the subject of a separate
article in this symposium. 28
Among legal writers there has been a renewal of the pioneer
pleas for wider legislative recognition of the differences between
close corporations and public-issue corporations, 29 but thus far no
state has enacted a separate statute for the close corporation. The
nearest approach to such a statute is to be found in the new North
Carolina Corporation Law, enacted in 1955, which contains a number of
permissive provisions to meet the special managerial needs of close
corporations 30 and may well become the model for future legislation
in this area.
As a rule partnership operation within the corporate shell demands
restrictions upon the transfer of shares to keep the corporation
"close," special voting arrangements to carry out the understanding
of the partners as to their respective share of control and enterprise
income, and some method of resolving problems of dissension and
deadlock. To achieve these objectives within the framework of most
of the existing corporation laws is a task that often challenges the
ingenuity of competent and well-trained lawyers to the utmost. There
are several possibilities with respect to "first refusal" options and
"buy-sell" agreements; variations in the voting rights of classified
shares; high quorum and high voting requirements; irrevocable
proxies and voting trusts; arbitration and dissolution provisions.
The situation is further complicated by the curious fact that, over
the years, the courts of the leading commercial states, and particularly
27. See, e.g., Jennings, The Role of the States in Corporate Regulation and
Investor Protection,23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 193 (1958).

28. Caplin, Subchapter S and Its Effect on the Capitalizationof Corporations,

13 VANv. L. Rsv. 185 (1959).
29. Symposium-The Close Corporation,42 Nw. U. L. Rsv. 345 (1957); Note,

Statutory Assistance for Closely Held Corporations,71 HAv. L. REV. 1498
(1958); Note, A Plea for Separate Statutory Treatment of the Close Corporation, 33 N.Y.U.L. REV. 700 (1958); Comment, Shareholders' Agreements and
the Statutory Norm, 43 Coam. L.Q. 68 (1957).
30. N.C. GEm. STAT. §§ 55-29, 55-63, 55-73, 55-125(3)

(Supp. 1959).
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the New York Court of Appeals, in dealing with these problems have
not been generally sympathetic to "variations from the statutory
norm," so that legislative relief becomes necessary. For example, it
was the Benintendi31 case, invalidating high-quorum and high-vote
provisions in the by-laws of a close corporation, that led to the enactment of section 9 of the New York Stock Corporation Law in 1948.
At the present time, on the other hand, there seems to be no way
of resolving dissension and deadlock in a profitable corporation under
recent New York decisions: Controversies cannot be arbitrated,32 and
dissolution is impossible because the courts will not find that such
a step would be beneficial to the shareholders.3 3 The extent to which
this and other troublesome problems can be resolved through properly
drafted shareholders' agreements is an open question.
It is also difficult to predict the extent to which the courts will
use their equity powers to prevent abuse or over-reaching by the
participants in a close corporation. For example, one method of
"freezing out" minority shareholders is to issue new shares at bargain
prices but in quantities that make it financially impossible for the
minority to preserve their proportionate interest by exercising their
pre-emptive rights. North Carolina has granted relief in such a
case;34 Missouri and Pennsylvania have not.3 5 New York has indicated
that the only relationship between the participants in a corporation
is that arising from their being shareholders since "a joint venture
may not be carried on by individuals through the corporate form"; 5
but the United States Circuit Court for the District of Columbia
has perceptively pointed out that the fiduciary duties between shareholders of a close corporation are analagous to those between part7
hers.3
The main point of this brief survey is to -emphasize that this important area of corporate practice has within the past fifteen years
become a technical specialty requiring greater skill and experience
than, is commonly realized. Fortunately for the profession, the
current literature on the subject is extensive and helpful.3 8
31. Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945), 159
A.L.R. 280 (1945).
32. On application of Burkin, 1 N.Y.2d 570, 136 N.E.2d 862 (1956), reversing
286 App. Div. 740, 147 N.Y.S.2d 2 (1955).
33. See,-e.g., In re Radom & Neidorff, Inc., 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563 (1954).
Cf. In re Security Fin. Co., 49 Cal. 2d 370, 317 P.2d 1 (1957); Krall v. Krall,
I
141 Conn. 3A5,106 A.2d 165 (1954).
34. Gaineiv. Long Mfg. Co., 234 N.C.-340; 67 S.E.2d 350 (1951).
_35. Maguire v. Osborne; 388 Pa. 121, 130"A.2d 157 (1957), criticized in 1957
MNuAL SuRv. Am. L. 283, 284; Bellows v. Porter, 104 F. Supp. 648 (W.D. Mo.
1952).
,
36. Weisman v. Awnair Corp. of America, 3 N.Y.2d 444, 449, 144 N.E.2d 415,
418 (1957).
37. Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
38. See e.g., O'NEAL, CLOSE CORORATIONS (1958). See also, sources cited at

note 29 supra; Hornstein, Arbitration in the "Incorporated Partnership," 12
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IV. CoRPoRATIoN FINANCE
The most striking development in corporate finance in recent years
has been the widespread custom of issuing common shares at prices
well in excess of a low or nominal par value. Only in the case of preferred shares is the issue price likely to correspond to the par
value, which in turn is probably equal or close to the redemption
price. In consequence, the benchmark of residuary legal capital,
which in the traditional lore of the corporation law stands as the
cushion of creditors and senior shareholders against loss, has tended
to lose its significance. The situation is accentuated by the liberal
provisions of the influential A.B.A. Model Act permitting both "stated
capital" and "capital surplus" to be returned to the shareholders as
"distributions in partial liquidation." 39 The net result is a fundamental
change in the law of dividends, which in effect substitutes the test of
solvency for the time-honored concepts of profits and surplus. Although this development has been viewed with alarm by many
writers,40 it is perhaps appropriate to mention that staid Massachusetts
has navigated very well for many years with the solvency test for
41
legal dividends.
The modern statutes tend to distinguish between true "dividends,"
paid out of accumulated earnings (earned surplus), and distributions
out of capital surplus which in the main represent return of invested
capital. This is a definite improvement in proper labeling, but its implications have not yet been extended to the law of stock dividends
and split-ups. There is still no statute which protects the integrity of
the earned surplus account when stock dividends are issued in
shares of low par value, with the result that a large stock dividend
often has the effect of a split-up. Apart from its importance with
respect to subsequent dividends, the situation presents special difficulties in connection with trust administration.42 The New York
Stock Exchange, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants have recognized
the problem, but their recommended solutions are probably not
43
suitable for general statutory enactment.
ARB. J. 28 (1957); Symposium: Close Corporation,18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
433-583 (1953).

39. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 41 (1953).
40. See, e.g., Hackney, The Financial Provisions of the Model Business

CorporationAct, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1357 (1957), and sources cited.

41. MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 156, § 37 (1948).
42. See, e.g., In re Fosdick's Trust, 4 N.Y.2d 646, 152 N.E.2d 228 (1958);

Comment, 32 N.Y.U.L. REV. 878 (1957).

43. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULL. No.

43 at 49 (1953) makes the distinction that a stock dividend is essentially
motivated by a desire to retain earnings in the enterprise while giving stockholders evidence of the absolute increase of their interest in the corporation,
while a stock split-up refers to an issuance of shares designed to reduce the

unit price of shares and thus increase marketability.
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Of more limited interest is the history of New Jersey's "dividend

credit" doctrine which in effect would make non-cumulative preferred
stock cumulative to the extent of earnings. A number of post-World
War II decisions seemed to indicate that the doctrine was about to
be discarded, 44 but in 1956 the New Jersey Supreme Court in a
powerful dictum reaffirmed the doctrine as a rule of construction.45 A
federal court has rejected the doctrine with respect to an Illinois
corporation; 46 but North Carolina has enacted it in its new corpora47

tion law.
The traditional principle that the declaration of dividends is a
matter entirely within the discretion of directors has been consistently
upheld in most jurisdictions. However, North Carolina has preserved
the substance of its mild compulsory dividend provisions,48 Maine
has continued to interpret preferred stock provisions in favor of
compulsory dividends,49 and an unambiguously drafted mandatorydividend charter provision has been sustained under New Jersey
law.50
With respect to federal regulation of securities, the most important
development of the post-war period was the decision that SEC Rule
X-10B-5, under section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, can be the basis of a civil action for misrepresentation or omission of facts relevant to the sale of securities.5 1 The 1954 amendments
previously mentioned have tended to simplify registration requirements,52 but the SEC proposal to raise the registration exemption
from $300,000 to $500,000 failed of adoption. 53 Proposals for extending
the coverage of the securities acts to unlisted securities also failed
of enactment.%
On the other hand, there has been a resurgence of the movement
toward reasonable uniformity in state regulation of securities. A
44. See particularly, Agnew v. American Ice Co., 2 N.J. 291, 66 A.2d 330
(1949); Dohme v. Pacific Coast Co., 5 N.J. Super. 477, 68 A.2d 490 (Ch. 1949);
1949 ANNUAL Suuv. Am. L. 567-68 (criticizing both cases).
45. Sanders v. Cuba R.R., 21 N.J. 78, 120 A.2d 849 (1956). Cf. Leeds &
Lippincott Co. v. Nevins, 51 N.J. Super. 343, 144 A.2d 4 (Ch. 1958).
46. Guttmann v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 189 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 867 (1951).
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-40(c), 55-2(5) (Supp. 1959).
48. N.C. GzN. STAT. § 55-50(i) (Supp. 1959). The former provision was
N.C. Acts 1901, ch. 2, § 52.
49. New England Trust Co. v. Penobscot Chem. Fibre Co., 142 Me. 286, 50
A.2d 188 (1946).
50. Arizona W. Ins. Co. v. L.L. Constantin & Co., 247 F.2d 388 (3rd Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 905 (1957). But see L. L. Constantin & Co. v. R. P.
Holding Corp., 153 A.2d 378 (N.J. Super. 1959).
51. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951); Kardon v.

National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 52 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (decision on demurrer),
73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (decision on merits).
52. Supra note 15.
53. See Loss, SECuRiTEs REGULATION 379-87

legislative history and sources on this proposal.
54. E.g., S. 1168, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).

(1951,

Supp. 1955)

for the
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new Uniform Act, drafted by Louis Loss and Edward Cowett, appeared in 1956 and within two years was said by its draftsmen to
have influenced the laws of at least ten jurisdictions.5
V. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND TENmu
The basic patterns of executive compensation have not materially
changed during the past fifteen years, i.e., bonuses, profit-sharing
contracts, retirement and dependents' benefits plans, and stockpurchase options. However, the continuing high rates of personal
income taxes have greatly increased the popularity, in both close and
public-issue corporations, of schemes to defer taxes or to take advantage of the lower rates applicable to capital gains. The classical
legal problems-adverse interest, lack of consideration, waste of corporate assets-are still present, and new problems have arisen as to
the applicability of the federal securities acts to stock-option plans.
There is evidence that the concept of "incentive" compensation has
gained wide acceptance both in business and in the courts. At least
in Pennsylvania, the question of consideration for cash bonuses,
reasonable in amount and approved by a majority of the shares, has
recently been brushed aside on the ground that such payments to
officers have become established business practice.5 Nevertheless,
many a stock-option plan has been scuttled by the absence of "consideration"-not contractual consideration but the type that is required for valid issue of the shares themselves. 7 A number of states
have enacted statutes making the directors' judgment "as to consideration and the sufficiency thereof," in connection with stock option
plans, conclusive in the absence of fraud.5 8 But careful draftsmen
will, of course, study the adverse decisions as well as the features
of successful plans.

The tax aspects of "restricted" stock options are beyond the scope
of this paper. Attention should be called, however, to the potential
liability of "insiders" for short-swing profits5 9 and the possibility that
executives who borrow money to exercise their options and. later sell
the stock to repay the loan may be considered as underwriters under
the securities acts.6
55. Loss &CoWETT, BLUE SKY LAw 421-31 (1958).
56. Chambers v. Beaver-Advance Corp., 392 Pa. 481, 140 A.2d 808 (1958).
57. See, e.g., Dow v. River Farms Co., 110 Cal. App. 2d 403, 243 P.2d 95
(1952); Elster v. American Airlines, Inc., 106 A.2d 202 (Del. Ch. 1954), 128
A.2d 801 (Del. Ch. 1957) (decision on jurisdictional issue) (summary judgment denied); Kerbs v. California E. Airways, Inc., 90 A.2d 652 (Del. 1952);
Moore v. Keystone Macaroni Mfg. Co., 370 Pa. 172, 87 A.2d 295 (1952) (involvbig payments to the widow of an executive).
58. See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK CORP.LAW § 69; DEL. CODE AN., tit. 8, § 157 (1953).
59. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15
U.S.C. § 78(p) (a) (1952). See also, Greene v. Dietz, 247 F.2d 689 (2d Cir.
1957).
60. This was a major topic of discussion at the Round Table on Securities
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Specific statutory amendments to overcome the adverse interest
problem have been enacted in a few states.61 On the issue of waste
of corporate assets, the most important test is the reasonableness of
the compensation in relation to the services rendered. 62 Shareholder
approval, even if not unanimous, seems to make a difference, although
the rationale is not entirely clear.P
On the question of tenure, there is conflict between a by-law
permitting removal of directors without cause at any time and a
charter provision for cumulative voting.i4 If both features are desired,
the conflict may be resolved by a further provision that removal of
any director without cause shall require a new election of the entire
board.
VI. CORPORATE MANAGEIVENT

The problem of adverse interest of directors is, of course, far
broader than self-dealing in the matter of compensation. The general
trend has been toward a practical solution of this problem by the
test of "fairness," even where the vote of interested directors is
necessary to authorize the transaction in issue. The leading case
of the post-war years on this point is probably Sterling v. Mayflower
Hotel Corp.,65 upholding the validity of a by-law permitting interested
directors to vote despite the lack of statutory authorization and the
prohibition against counting such votes at common law. The directors
and majority shareholders had approved a merger proposal in which
their interest in the other corporation was widely known and fully
disclosed; the interested directors were needed to make a quorum and
their vote was necessary to bring the merger plan (which passed
the test of "fairness") before the shareholders.
Before going into the problems of managerial violation of fiduciary
duties, it is appropriate to mention the widespread adoption in recent
years of statutes authorizing corporate reimbursement of litigation
expenses of directors who have not been guilty of negligence or
Regulation, Association of American Law Schools meeting in San Francisco,
December 1957, stimulated by an excellent paper by Professor Alfred F.
Conard.
61. See, e.g., WIs. STAT. ANN, § 180.31 (1957), superseding the case of Stoiber
v. Miller Brewing Co., 257 Wis. 13, 42 N.W.2d 144 (1950). Cf. CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 820 (1947).
62. Berkwitz v.Humphrey, 163 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Ohio 1958).
63. It is at least arguable that such approval supports the good faith of
the directors in fixing the consideration to be received for shares. On the
statutory side, compare ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 18A (1953) and
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-45 (Supp. 1959), requiring such approval, with Orno
REV. CODE § 1701.17 (Page Supp. 1956) and PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 15, § 2852-612

(1958) (amended in 1957 to eliminate stockholders' approval requirement).
64. In re Rogers Imports, Inc., 202 Misc. 761, 116 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup. Ct.
1952).
65. 93 A.2d 107 (Del. 1952), affirming 33 Del. Ch. 20, 89 A.2d 862 (1952).
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misconduct. 66 But the courts have tended to construe these statutes
strictly, both as to the type of actions to which they apply 67 6and as
to the effect of successful defense other than "on the merits." 8
In a broad social sense, perhaps the most significant decisions of
the past fifteen years are those of the New York Court of Appeals
holding that the traditional business judgment of directors must be
subordinated to the public policy expressed in statutes involving
economic regulation. The significance of these decisions is highlighted
by the fact that in 1944 the court had exonerated directors who,
in the exercise of their business judgment, had technically compounded a felony by yielding to a racketeer's extortion. 69 In 1947,
however, the same court announced that the business judgment rule
would not protect the directors from personal liability for corporate
losses arising from anti-union activities and other alleged violations
of the federal labor-relations acts,7 0 even if the directors honestly
believed these statutes to be unconstitutional. Some years later, the
same principle was applied to alleged violations of the federal antitrust laws, with the further result that a director who had pleaded
"nollo contendere" was disqualified from reimbursement of his litigation expenses, regardless of whether the cartel agreement in question
might have been profitable to the corporation.71 The rationale of these
cases raises certain difficulties. Of course, labor relations statutes
and antitrust laws should be enforced according to their terms. The
question is whether additional civil liabilities or disabilities should
be imposed upon the directors who in good faith are seeking to
protect the corporation's interests, particularly as economic legislation
proliferates in an atmosphere of sharp political conflict and even
legal experts are in disagreement concerning the scope of permissible
business conduct. There have been important voices raised in support
66. Among the jurisdictions which have adopted such statutes are: Delaware, District of Columbia, New York, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Texas, and
Wisconsin. See Frampton, Indemnification of Insiders' Litigation Expenses,
23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 325 (1958), which lists and discusses these statutes.
67. Sorensen v. Overland Corp., 242 F.2d 70 (3d Cir. 1957), affirming 142 F.
Supp. 354 (D.Del. 1956); Schwarz v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 305 N.Y.
395, 113 N.E.2d 533 (1953); McNeill v. Succop, 10 Misc. 2d 608, 169 N.Y.S.2d
506 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
68. Compare Mooney v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., 204 F.2d 888 (3d
Cir. 1953), and Dornan v. Humphrey, 278 App. Div. 1010, 106 N.Y.S.2d 142
(1951) (statute of limitations), and Tichner v. Andrews, 193 Misc. 1050, 85
N.Y.S.2d 760 (Sup. Ct. 1949), ajFd without opinion, 275 App. Div. 749, 90
N.Y.S.2d 920 (1951) (plaintiff failed to post security for expenses), with
Diamond v. Diamond, 307 N.Y. 263, 120 N.E.2d 819 (1954)

(plaintiff estopped

by participation in wrongdoing).
69. Hornstein v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 292 N.Y. 468, 55 N.E.2d 740
(1944).
70. Abrams v. Allen, 297 N.Y. 52, 74 N.E.2d 305 (1947). On the trial of this
case on the merits, however, the directors were exonerated. 113 N.Y.S.2d 181
(Sup. Ct. 1952).

71. Schwarz v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 305 N.Y. 395, 113 N.E.2d 533
(1953).
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of the view that directors are fiduciaries not only for the shareholders
but also for the public at large.7 2 With the exception of the widespread approval of corporate gifts to charity,

3

this view seems to

have made little headway in the statutes or in the courts;7 4 but if
the cases discussed in this paragraph imply that directors are personally responsible for seeing to it that the corporation act as a "good
citizen" in the Socratic sense, the possibilities for the future may
well stagger the imagination.
The significant developments in the more traditional areas of
fiduciary obligations involve transactions by "management" in the
stock of the corporation. Judicial decisions have reaffirmed the fiduciary duties of the controlling shareholders to the minority 5 and have
generally followed the "special facts" doctrine of the United States
Supreme Court7 6 in holding the directors liable for breach of duty
to the individual shareholders. It may be fairly stated, as one reviewer has done, that the modern view imposes upon an "insider"
who purchases stock from a shareholder the affirmative duty to dis77
close facts known to him that may affect the value of the stock.
In this area, section 10 (b) of the Securities and Exchange Act has
had an enormous impact. Civil actions for fraud can now be brought
in the federal courts, thus providing flexibility in bringing in parties
from other states even if the shares are not traded in an organized
exchange or in the "over-the-counter" market, provided the transaction involves interstate commerce or any use of the mails.7 8 Furthermore, the statutory right of the corporation to recover the shortswing profits of "insiders" has undoubtedly tended to discourage
72. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 164, 168-188 (1954);
OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE-A STUDy IN RESPONSIBILITY 92-93
(1954); Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. REV.

GOYDER, THE FUTURE

1145 (1932).
73. See Latty, Some Miscellaneous Novelties in the New Corporation
Statutes, 23 LAw & CONTEM¢P. PROB. 363, 369 (1958), and sources cited.
74. It will be recalled that Henry Ford's defense of his limited dividends
against minority stockholders on the ground of his desire to reduce car prices
and create more jobs was rejected in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich.
459, 505-06, 170 N.W. 668, 683-84 (1919). Cf. Katz, The Philosophy of Midcentury CorporationStatutes, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 177, 188-92 (1958).
75. See, e.g., Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947); Johnson v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co., 159 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. La. 1958).
76. Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909).

77. Note, Insider's Duty to Disclosure When PurchasingStock from a Share-

holder,43 IowA L. REV. 109 (1957).
78. See, e.g., Stadia Oil & Uranium Co. v. Wheelis, 251 F.2d 269 (10th Cir.
1957); Schillner v. H. Vaughan Clarke & Co., 134 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1943);
Dupler v. Simmons, 163 F. Supp. 535 (D. Wyo. 1958); Northern Trust Co. v.
Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Ill. 1952); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951). Cf. Creswell-Keith, Inc. v.
Willingham, 160 F. Supp. 735 (W.D. Ark. 1958). See note, 49 COLUM. L. REV.
1018 (1949).
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misuse of inside information to the detriment of unsuspecting share9
holders2
The most dramatic extension of the range of fiduciary obligations
of controlling shareholders to other shareholders, however, was made
in Perlman v. Feldmann.80 The case was tried, probably incorrectly,
as a derivative action on the theory that the "sale of control" is an
unlawful appropriation of a "corporate asset." 81 Theory aside, the: decision of the court was that the seller of controlling shares must
account to the other shareholders for the premium received in excess
of the value of the shares divorced from control. The earlier precedents had proceeded on tort principles, imposing liability only when
the seller of control knew or should have known that the purchaser
was likely to "loot" the corporation. 82 The new doctrine apparently
is based on trust concepts, although its rationale is by no means
clearA8 In any event, the case indicates that sellers of controlling
shares will do well, where possible, to persuade the buyer to make
the same offer to minority shareholders.
VII. "CoRPoRATE DEmocRAcy"
For two or three years during the period under study, there was
quite a flurry of writing on the subject of "corporate democracy,"
chiefly in support of the efforts of the SEC to improve its proxy rules.
To the extent that greater shareholder participation in the government of publicly held corporations was expected to result from the
rules on the submission of "shareholders' proposals," the gain has
been insignificant. 84 However, there is little doubt that the rules have
led to fuller disclosure to the shareholders on matters of corporate
policy, with consequent improvement in the standards of corporate
management.
Perhaps of even greater importance is the potential impact of
the new rules upon proxy campaigns. There were several dramatic
struggles for control during the post-war years, and the tactics involved in some contests (e.g., Montgomery Ward and New York
Central Railroad) can conservatively be described as flamboyant.
The new SEC rules require fuller disclosure of behind-the-scenes
79. See Cole, Insiders' Liabilities Under the Securities Exchange Act of

1934, 12 Sw. L.J. 147 (1958) and cases cited.

80. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
& MEANs, THE
81. Id. at 174-75. This theory was suggested by BE=I
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 244 (1933). Cf. Comment, 22 U.
Cn. L. REV. 895, 897 n.13 (1955).
82. See, e.g., Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22
(E.D. Pa. 1940); Benson v. Braun, 141 N.Y.S.2d 286 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Gerdes
v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
83. Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HARv. L. REV. 986 (1957). See de
Capriles & Prunty, Corporations,1955 ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 332, 340-42 (1955).
84. Based on a review in each of the past several years of the proxy statements of over 100 of the larger corporations in the United States.
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operations and the cost of proxy campaigns, and exclusion from proxy
statements of charges of immoral conduct, unsupported accusations,
etc. Speeches, press releases and radio and TV scripts are subject to
the rules against misleading statements.8 5
Proxy contests can be a heavy burden upon the corporate treasury.
The right of incumbents to reimbursement for the cost of soliciting
proxies for their re-election has usually been sustained on the theory
that management is entitled to explain to the shareholders its position
on questions of policy.88 During the past fifteen years, a new principle
has been adopted for the reimbursement of the election expenses of
successful insurgents, at least when policy questions are involved
and shareholder approval is obtained.8 7 In the leading case on this
subject, the treasury of an important, but by no means "giant," corporation was tapped for more than $260,000-$134,000 for the expenses
of incumbents and $127,500 for those of the successful insurgents.88
The Montgomery Ward contest resulted in the invalidation of
staggered elections of directors (through division of the board into
classes) on the ground of conflict with Illinois' constitutional guarantee of cumulative voting. 89 The following year, Pennsylvania adopted
what was essentially a contrary position, o although the two constitutional provisions are distinguishable on their exact language. Since
then West Virginia 91 has followed Illinois, and Arizona 92 has followed
'Pennsylvania. Ohio has superseded an ill-advised decision that had
upheld single-director classes despite a statutory requirement of
cumulative voting; 93 the new corporation law provides that each

class must consist of at least three directors. 94 Notwithstanding the
Illinois view, this is a sensible compromise of the apparent policy
95
conflict.
When fundamental changes are involved, the approval of a majority
or more of the shares is usually required.96 With minor exceptions,
85. Current rules are published at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14 (1949).

The 1956

amendments are set forth separately at 21 FED. REG. 577-581 (Jan. 26, 1956).

86. See, e.g., Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen Corp., 20 Del. Ch.
78, 171 Atl. 226 (1934).
87. Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (applying Delaware law); Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168,
128 N.E.2d 291 (1955).
88. Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., supranote 87.
89. Wolfson v. Avery, 6 Ill.2d 78, 126 N.E.2d 701 (1955).
90. Janney v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 387 Pa. 282, 128 A.2d 76 (1956).
91. State ex rel. Syphers v. McCune, 101 S.E.2d 834 (W. Va. 1958).
92. Bohannan v. Corporation Comm'n, 82 Ariz. 299, 313 P.2d 379 (1957).
93. Humphrys v. Winous Co., 165 Ohio St. 45, 133 N.E.2d 780 (1956).
94. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.57 (Page Supp. 1956).
95. A single-director class is unacceptable to the minority because it completely frustrates cumulative voting; a two-director class is unacceptable to
the majority because it permits holders of one share more than one-third of
the stock to elect half of the directors.
96. For summary and discussion of the statutes, see Lattin, Minority and
Dissenting Shareholders'Rights in Fundamental Changes, 23 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 307 (1958).
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97
however, dissenting shareholders may not enjoin such changes;
their only effective remedy as a rule is the statutory right of appraisal which' varies considerably from state to state. The most
comprehensive statute is that of New York, which extends to employee
stock plans, sales of assets other than in the regular course of
business, mergers and consolidations, and changes affecting adversely
the preferences, redemption rights, pre-emptive rights, or voting
Tights of outstanding shares.98 There are also wide differences in the
procedure to be followed and in the rights and liabilities of the parties
at various stages of the appraisal process. In general, when the stock
is listed and actively traded on a national securities exchange, the
New York courts have regarded market value as controlling;9 9 but
other factors may enter into the appraisal value when the market
is not sufficiently broad.10°

VIII. SHAREHOLDERS' AcTioNs

Up to World War II, the most effective weapon of the small stockholder against abuses of power by self-perpetuating management was
the derivative action.' 0 ' Since 1944, however, the usefulness of the
derivative action has been greatly reduced in some states by statutes
ostensibly enacted to curb the evils of the "strike suit," and in other
states by a court-imposed requirement of demand upon the shareholders to undertake the litigation against the accused directors.
There have been also some judicial decisions tending to soften the
burden of the new legislation; other decisions tend to aggravate it.
It is fair to say, however, that the past fifteen years have seen a
significant change in this aspect of shareholder control of management.
The pioneer New York statute, which in principle has been adopted
in a half-dozen other important jurisdictions, combined the old
federal "contemporaneous ownership" rule (originally adopted to
reduce the burden of derivative litigation in the federal courts) with
a new "security for expenses" provision. The former required the
plaintiff to show that he was a shareholder at the time of the wrong
of which he complained, or that the stock had since devolved upon
97. Ibid. See also Gibson, How Fixed Are Class Shareholder Rights?, 23

LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 283 (1958).

98. N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 21 (1951) and sections referred to therein.
99. Application of Deutschmann, 281 App. Div. 14, 116 N.Y.S.2d 578 (1952).
Application of Marcus, 273 App. Div. 725, 79 N.Y.S.2d 76 (1948).

100. Application of Silverman, 282 App. Div. 252, 122 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1953).
For the Delaware view, see Heller v. Munsingwear, 33 Del. Ch. 593, 98 A.2d
774 (1953); Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch. 523, 74 A.2d 71
(1950).
101. See Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders' Derivative Suits in
New York, 32 CAin. L. REV. 123 (1944); Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 COLum. L. REv. 1 (1947).
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him by operation of law. The latter entitled the corporation, as a
technical defendant, to demand that the stockholder plaintiff, if he
owned less than five per cent or $50,000 worth of any'class of stock,
post security to reimburse the corporation for its litigation expenses
(including attorney's fees) and similar expenses of any person that
the corporation may be required to indemnify. (It is significant that
New York's first indemnification statute for directors was enacted
simultaneously.) By 1949, the constitutionality of "security for
expenses" statutes, as well as their applicability in the federal courts,
had been established. 102 The risk to the plaintiff inherent in security
orders for many thousands of dollars reduced the number of derivative actions to a small percentage of the annual average before the
War.103
One may wonder whether this restrictive legislation would have
been enacted in New York if Clarke v. Greenberg'0 4 had been decided a few years earlier. In 1947, this case took the profit out of
the "strike suit" by requiring the plaintiff in an earlier derivative
action, who had sold his shares worth about $50 to the defendant
directors for $9,000, to account to the corporation for the proceeds of
the sale. Another possible loophole for private profit, i.e., settlement
in the form of payment of attorney's fees to plaintiff's counsel, was
closed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals the following year.10 5
In 1950, the hardship of the security requirement was tempered by
a notable opinion of the highest New York court upholding "conditional" security orders, which allow the plaintiff a period of grace
within which he may solicit the joinder of enough other shares to
avoid the posting of security. 0 6 This decision was followed by holdings
in the federal district court for the Southern District of New York
(1) that the additional shareholders who join the action need not
meet the "contemporaneous ownership" rule, 0 7 and (2) that identity
of citizenship between such additional plaintiffs and the defendants
will not destroy federal diversity jurisdiction. 108 Unfortunately, recent cases in the same court have imposed the federal "contemporaneous ownership" rule upon the additional plaintiffs. 109
The California security statute differs from New York's in making
102. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
103. Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 CoLum.

L. REv. 1, 12 n.61, 31 (1947).

104. 296 N.Y. 146, 71 N.E.2d 443 (1947).
105. Certain-Teed Products Corp. v. Topping, 171 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1948).
106. Baker v. MacFadden Publications, Inc., 300 N.Y. 325, 90 N.E.2d 876
(1950).
107. FED. R. Cirv. P. 23 (b). Fuller v. American Mach. & Foundry Co., 95 F.

Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).

108. Weinstock v. Kallett, 11 F.R.D. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
109. Elkins v. Bricker, 147 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Kaufman v. Wolfson, 136 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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no distinction between large and small shareholders, and in requiring
the posting of security only upon a pre-trial determination (a) that
there is no reasonable probability that the action will be of benefit to
the corporation, or (b) that the individual defendant who makes
the motion did not participate in the transaction complained of." 0
However, the motion for security can be made by any defendant
whether or not the corporation is liable to reimburse him,"' and
the plaintiff is denied the normal discovery process at the pre-trial
hearing."2 Thus a statute that in its face looks fairer than New
York's turns out to be more harmful to the legitimate derivative
action.
In states which do not have "security for expenses" legislation,
such as Massachusetts and Delaware, the chief threat to the legitimate
derivative action is an indiscriminate insistence that the plaintiff
make a demand upon the shareholders before instituting his suit.
The orthodox view is that such demand is necessary only if the
subject matter of the derivative action is within the area of effective
ratification by majority vote of disinterested shareholders. The early
Massachusetts cases omitted this limitation," 3 but there is some indication of progress in the right direction." 4
These restrictions on the derivative action have underscored the
modern importance of sound analysis of the theory upon which the
shareholder proceeds. In many situations a given state of facts may
support either a derivative action asserting a right of the corporation
(to which the above mentioned restrictions apply) or an "individual"
action asserting the personal right of the plaintiff and other share-

holders (to which those restrictions do not apply). The courts have
not always made the correct distinction," 5 but the fault may lie
with inadequate argument of counsel." 6
To complete this part of the post-war survey, it is necessary to
mention briefly two developments in the federal courts that will
tend to facilitate certain derivative actions. The first is a long over110. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 834 (Deering 1953)

111. CAL. CoRP. CODE ANN. § 834(b) (Deering i953). Beyerbach v. Juno Oil
Co., 42 Cal.2d 11, 265 P.2d 1 (1954).
112. Melancon v. Superior Court, 42 Cal.2d 698, 268 P.2d 1050 (1954).
113. See, e.g., Pomerantz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341 (D. Mass. 1951); S.
Solomont & Sons Trust, Inc. v. New England Theatres Operating Corp., 326
Mass. 99, 93 N.E.2d 241 (1950).
114. Braunstein v. Devine, 149 N.E.2d 628 (Mass. 1958); Mayer v. Adams,
141 A.2d 458 (Del. 1958).

115. See Gordon v. Elliman, 306 N.Y. 456, 119 N.E.2d 331 (1954)

(holding

that a suit to compel declaration of dividends is derivative). For the better
view, see Knapp v. Bankers Securities Corp., 230 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1956);
Conviser v. Simpson, 122 F. Supp. 205 (D. Md. 1954).
116. See discussion of Gordon v. Elliman, 280 App. Div. 655, 116 N.Y.S.2d
671 (1952), in de Capriles, Corporations,1952 ANN. SuRVEY AM. LAw 388, 407
(1952). De Capriles & Reichardt, Corporations, 1952 Survey of N.Y. Law, 27
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1041, 1044 (1952).
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due elimination of the procedural obstacles to the triple-damage derivative suit under the antitrust laws.n 7 The second is the revision
of the rules on the alignment of the corporation as plaintiff or defendant for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction." 8
IX. FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
In a space of twelve years, 1945-1957, the United States Supreme
Court has for all practical purposes eliminated, as to federal due
process, the "doing business" test for jurisdiction over foreign corporations. The standard of "fair play and substantial justice," enunciated
in the InternationalShoe case," 9 has expanded to the point where a
single contact with the forum, as in the McGee case, 120 may be sufficient to sustain service of process.' 2 ' The factual rationale of this

development lies in the growth of national corporations, operating in
a nation-wide market; conceptually, the acceptance or rejection of
state jurisdiction is based on forum non conveniens considerations.
Some states have taken full advantage of this concept; 122 others,
notably New York, have continued to apply the "doing business" test,
12
using the mechanical "solicitation plus" standard for this purpose. 3
On the whole, the tradition against interference by the courts of a
state in the internal affairs of foreign corporations has been observed.
There is still concern, however, with the problem of the pseudoforeign corporation, organized in another state but functioning in
all respects as a domestic corporation. 24
X.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing survey, it is believed, amply demonstrates the kaleidoscopic variety of the corporate developments of the past fifteen years,
even though for obvious reasons much of the detail has had to be
omitted. General conclusions are difficult to draw.
It seems likely that the success of capitalist enterprise in this,
period and the self-imposed improvement in standards of corporate
117. Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir.
1953), reversing 107 F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), which relied on United
States Supreme Court precedents decided prior to the 1938 enactment of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
118. See Swanson v. Traer, 354 U.S. 114 (1957); Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S.
91 (1957).
119. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
120. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).

121. See Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause ana the In
Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. Cur. L. REv. 569 (1958).
122. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 88(b) (1951); N.C. GEI'. STAT.
§ 55-38:1 (Supp. 1957); VT. STAT. § 1562 (1947). See also Gordon Armstrong
Co. v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 2d 211, 325 P.2d 21 (1958), for a good
example of the application of modern principles.
123. See Miller v. Surf Properties, Inc., 4 N.Y.2d 475, 151 N.E.2d 874, 176
N.Y.S.2d 318 (1958).
124. See Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137 (1955).
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management have retarded the underlying trend toward expansion
of the role of government in the regulation of economic affairs.
There has been no occasion for new dramatic statutory enactments
of the type that were born out of the great depression; academic
pleas for mild but tighter controls over managerial power have
evoked little response from state legislatures. A few judicial decisions have suggested new directions in the path of managerial accountability, but it cannot be said that substantial progress has
really been made toward a "socially responsible" capitalism. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to suppose that corporation law and
practice have become stable or static subjects. The evidence of
their dynamic quality, whether for good or evil, is clear from the
record.

